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Abstract 4 
There is now a large body of work that seeks to understand the evolution of planning 5 
systems across the globe, particularly the adaptation of planning to/under varying forms of 6 
neoliberalism.  Some of this research seeks to provide empirical insights into new state 7 
spaces and the actors that occupy them. Others have made theoretical explanation of the 8 
reform agenda their goal.  In sum much of the literature now points to an academic 9 
understanding of government policies on planning as representative of a ‘new moment’, 10 
characterised by a post-political narrowing of debate on what the fundamental objectives of 11 
the activity should be.  In this contribution, we find grounds to agree with aspects of this 12 
analysis that takes the post-political as an explanatory framework.  However, using the 13 
passage of the UK Localism and Decentralisation Bill into law as the Localism Act 2011 we 14 
argue that the process of enacting planning reform was accompanied by acts of 15 
manipulation (heresthetics) and decontestation that accord more closely to traditional and 16 
long-standing methods of political action motivated by ideology.   17 
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English Planning Policy. 25 
Introduction 26 
Across the globe professional planning as a state-led aspect of public policy is being 27 
circumscribed (Gunn and Hillier, 2012; Hrelja, 2011; Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2013; 28 
Mäntysalo and Saglie, 2010; MacCullum and Hopkins, 2011).  In those contexts which have 29 
gone furthest in de-professionailsing planning this process has often been accompanied by a 30 
programme of rhetorical political vilification (Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2013).  In this paper 31 
we use concepts from political science – heresthetics and decontestation – to investigate a 32 
specific example of the political act of caricaturing planning as a conduit to achieving its 33 
reform. 34 
In contrast to those commentators who have understood the most recent chapters in the 35 
saga of English planning reform to be simply the latest legislative revisions in a professional 36 
history characterised by many such moments, we argue that the changes ushered in by the 37 
2011 Localism Act result from an impetus that is in large measure ideological in character.  38 
Urban planning in the UK has been subject to five significant legislative changes since 2004 39 
and, since the 1980s, has been a key battleground in the realpolitik of neoliberailsm on 40 
which state restructuring, privatisation, deregulation, and austerity have been played out 41 
(Tewdwr-Jones, 2012).  Consequently the new institutional landscape that has sprung up as 42 
a result of the political attention paid to planning in the UK post-2010 has been the main 43 
focus of attention for many authors.  These institutions include the emergence of Local 44 
Enterprise Partnerships (Pugalis, 2011), Enterprise Zones (Bentley and Pugalis, 2013), City 45 
Deals (Waite et al., 2013), localism (Clarke and Cochrane, 2013), and neighbourhood 46 
planning (Holman and Rydin, 2013; Lord et al., 2017).   47 
For some academics these reforms can best be understood as hallmarks of a fundamental 48 
shift to a post-political order (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2010, 2012).  With respect to 49 
planning there have been several important contributions that outline specific evidence, 50 
some of it case based, on the ways in which the terms of what is now possible for planning 51 
to achieve have been limited and circumscribed (Haughton, Gilchrist and Swyngedouw, 52 
3 
 
2016; MacLeod, 2013; O’Callaghan, Boyle and Kitchen, 2014).  In aggregate Allmendinger 53 
and Haughton (2012: 101) argue that “what we are witnessing appears to be a new moment 54 
in the post-political management of dissent and the continuing selective displacement of 55 
the handling of controversial issues to alternative modes and scales of planning”.   56 
For others the value of post-politics as an analytical framework that might be applied to the 57 
urban as a political container is over-stated (Beveridge and Koch, 2016).  Here the post-58 
political is understood to represent a “trap” in which “political agency is reduced to the 59 
heroic and anti-heroic.  Thus, the plurality of political agency in the urban sphere and multi-60 
faceted forms of power lose their political quality” (Beveridge and Koch, 2017: 36).  This 61 
renewed focus on power and its political exercise are similarly present in the work of others 62 
(for example see Metzger, 2013; Metzger, Soneryd and Hallström, 2016).  In this 63 
contribution, we seek to build on this invocation to give political agency centre stage in 64 
relation to planning reform.  In so doing, it is our contention that there have been numerous 65 
such political acts in relation to planning that may have been not simply political in an 66 
instrumental sense, but better understood as ideological.     67 
In seeking to further the debate on the politics of planning reform we hope to show that 68 
successive governments in the UK have presented a characterisation of professional 69 
planning post-2010 that is aimed at undermining planning, to some extent, on ideological 70 
grounds.  We neither dispute that there have been moments of happenstance and political 71 
instrumentalism along the way, nor that these moments could be understood as consistent 72 
with a post-political narrowing of debate.  However, we do argue that it is important to 73 
acknowledge that the political treatment of planning in England post-2010 has been to 74 
some degree ideologically inspired, in contrast to those analyses that understand these 75 
moments to be a contingent feature of a specific moment in time.  We, therefore, hope to 76 
show that the reforms are strategically devised - albeit riven with inconsistencies deeply 77 
inscribed in modern Conservative politics (Tait and Inch, 2016). 78 
In what follows we begin by surveying the backdrop to planning reform before going on to 79 
provide a narrative history of the Localism and Decentralisation Bill that, following its 80 
parliamentary passage, became the 2011 Localism Act.  In looking closely at the details of 81 
the reform agenda we present a brief history of planning reform as a series of acts of 82 
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political agency.  We view this history through the lens provided by the concepts of political 83 
manipulation (heresthetics) and constructing false consensus (decontestation).  In the final 84 
section of the paper we show how these political acts have fundamentally altered the 85 
system of urban and regional planning to one where decision-making power is increasingly 86 
located at spatial poles: with central government or local, unelected, actors.  The result, we 87 
argue, maps neatly onto the established ideas of roll back/roll out neoliberalism. 88 
The context to planning reform 89 
Understanding planning reform can only be accomplished by reference to parallel changes 90 
within the wider suite of governmental activities of which it is a part.  In this regard, the 91 
recent decades have seen a huge amount of work published on the spatial morphology of 92 
western nation states (Brenner, 2004; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Peck, 2015 McCann, Roy and 93 
Ward, 2013).  Much of the research that has followed in the human geography literature has 94 
made significant progress in furthering our understanding of how formal sub-national 95 
spaces of statutory control are constructed, the state-animation of informal scales of 96 
governance, the linguistic associations employed by élites to politically charge geographical 97 
spaces of indeterminate meaning - such as the “local” (Clarke and Cochrane, 2013), and the 98 
establishment of functional geographies of very specific categories such as, for example, 99 
education (Harris et al., 2010; Singleton et al., 2011).   100 
The cumulative impression of these literatures has led some to argue that changes in 101 
particular aspects of governmental activity represent a post-bureaucratic victory for value-102 
free technological concepts of state-space over ideology (see Finlayson, 2012).  It is from 103 
this perspective that many of the reforms introduced by governments, such as those of New 104 
Labour in the UK between 1997-2010, have been analysed under the evidence-based 105 
paradigm or, more simply, under the banner “what matters is what works” (for a review of 106 
evidence-based policy as it relates to urban planning, see Lord and Hincks, 2010).  107 
Elsewhere, theoretically nuanced work has more recently sought to invoke the concept of 108 
the post-political to understand questions of scalar governance.  Here a particular style of 109 
language - ‘partnership’, ‘sustainable development’, ‘balanced growth’ etc. - has been 110 
identified as of particular relevance in the establishment of a, potentially superficial, 111 
consensus that may serve to sublimate actual or perceived tensions.      112 
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Although for some authors (e.g. Mouffe, 2005) the post-political has been understood as 114 
necessitating a fundamental change in the business of how politics is done, it may equally 115 
be argued that the concept does most explanatory work when applied to the languages of 116 
politics.  In this sense, the ambiguity of an expression such as ‘partnership working’ clearly 117 
bears close comparison with the wider class of anodyne, politically uncontroversial 118 
terminology of which it is an element.  However, the post-political interest in the language 119 
we use to do politics clearly does not foreclose the possibility of instrumental political action 120 
(Davidson and Iveson, 2014; Rosol, 2014).  The point is well-made by Allmendinger and 121 
Haughton when discussing ‘spatial planning’ (2012: 90): 122 
Rather than accept the mainstream view that presents spatial planning as 123 
a progressive change, this paper argues that there is a danger that the 124 
resulting planning system is not so much an empowering arena for 125 
debating wide-ranging societal options for future development, as a 126 
system focussed on carefully stage-managed processes with subtly but 127 
clearly defined parameters of what is open for debate. 128 
From this point of view a label such as ‘spatial planning’ might be understood as a post-129 
political symbolic marker, but the underlying activities of which it speaks - such as the act of 130 
suppressing debate - remain fundamentally political acts, consistent with the pre-party 131 
politics of Aristotle and everything after.  Moreover, these political acts can be more deeply 132 
political than simply an instrumental way of achieving an immediate objective; that is, they 133 
may be born of ideological commitment. 134 
From this perspective the post-political might be thought of as useful shorthand for thinking 135 
about a world of narrowed options and curtailed debate (Swyngedouw, 2009, 2011).  But 136 
the question of how this world has been constructed remains relevant; a fact that makes it 137 
somewhat surprising that there has been comparatively little research that has sought to 138 
test the concept empirically.  Indeed, amongst those studies that have made this their goal 139 
some have provided only heavily qualified support for the theory’s explanatory value, others 140 
have contested it more fundamentally (c.f. Deas, 2013a, 2013b; North, 2010).  For a 141 
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different group of dissenters there is something wrong with the terminology. The label 142 
‘post-political’ can arouse an instinctive hostility in some (e.g. McCarthy, 2013) for its 143 
implication that the act of creating this world of narrowed options and superficial (or 144 
artificial) consensus has itself in some sense been free of politics; and the defeatist 145 
extension of this line, that the possibility of political resistance or counter-action is 146 
diminished.  In response to these qualms we argue that understanding how the post-147 
political world has been made can only be accomplished by reference to a political-148 
ideological project.   It is this issue of ideology and its role in informing political action that 149 
we hope to resituate as the fundamentally significant explanatory variable in analysing the 150 
reforms made to English, planning. 151 
The instruments of attack: Heresthetics and decontestation in planning reform 152 
To accomplish the degree of reform that successive governments have been able to effect 153 
to planning in England we can turn to two concepts from political science: heresthetics and 154 
decontestation (Freeden, 1996).  The act of political manipulation of events and 155 
circumstances, or heresthetics (Riker, 1984, 1986), is the etymological twin of rhetoric, the 156 
art of political argumentation.  In this sense heresthetics provides us with an agential 157 
corrective to the post-political’s reification of defused language and apparent consensus.  In 158 
short, heresthetics reminds us that politics is first and foremost an activity.  It is “the art of 159 
setting up situations - composing the alternatives among which political actors must choose 160 
- in such a way that even those who do not wish to do so are compelled by the structure of 161 
the situation to support the heresthetician’s purpose” (Riker, 1983: 55).   162 
Research would suggest that manipulating circumstances to one’s political advantage is an 163 
activity at which the Conservative half of the Coalition government was particularly skilled.  164 
In a paper that sets out the negotiation that created the Coalition government itself through 165 
to the programme that would form the business of government (including planning reform) 166 
for the duration of the parliament, Heppel (2013) persuasively portrays David Cameron’s 167 
Conservatives as having expertly deployed bargaining and negotiation strategies.  In general 168 
this includes constructing caricatures of good and bad practice and using isolated examples 169 
to reinforce impressions of how ‘desirable’ outcomes might be encouraged.  Planning serves 170 
as a very good example of how such political manipulation might be achieved.  For example, 171 
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over the course of the period under which the Localism and Decentralisation Bill was being 172 
overhauled from its roots in Red Toryism to become the neoliberal artefact that is the 173 
Localism Act, a parallel vilification of planning was effected.  Cameron himself described 174 
planning officers as “enemies of enterprise” (Cameron quoted in The New Statesman, 175 
2011b), whilst Andrew Stunnel, a junior minister at the Department for Communities and 176 
Local Government, described planning more stridently: 177 
This isn’t brain surgery. This is about how you shape your community.  178 
This ought to be a community-owned occupation, not something that 179 
requires a huge, overwhelming amount of technical content (Stunnel, 180 
quoted in Carpenter, 2011). 181 
Similar views were often expressed by Eric Pickles, the Secretary of State for Communities 182 
and Local Government, including the wildly disproportionate association of the planning 183 
profession with “Stalinism”, whilst Nick Boles, a junior minister at CLG, referred to 184 
opponents of development as “hysterical, scare-mongering latter-day Luddites” (Boles, 185 
quoted in The Daily Mail, 2012).  Announcing a further wave of planning reform in 186 
September 2012 that would result in the Growth and Infrastructure Act (2013), the Prime 187 
Minister reaffirmed his commitment to “Get the planners off our backs” (Cameron, 2012).  188 
It is hard to imagine any other profession being singled out for this kind of character 189 
assassination.  Even social workers, the traditional bête noir of the political Right, have never 190 
had to contend with such open hostility from the political élite.  191 
By contrast, the possibility of a world without planning (as constructed) was politically 192 
assembled as possible and desirable.  As the profession was so clearly without any 193 
redeeming feature, it was portrayed as one of those previously statutory functions that 194 
could be turned over to individual citizens to enact for themselves.  The way this was 195 
politically manufactured was as an extension of the Big Society narrative that accords wholly 196 
positive associations to the idea that once formal agencies, such as planning, have been 197 
divested of their political power, this can be re-invested in anyone who wishes to grasp it, 198 
or, as Cameron has described it: “That’s why so much of my leadership is about unleashing 199 
your leadership.  Giving everyone who wants to seize it the opportunity, the support and 200 
above all the freedom to get things done.  Giving everyone who wants to believe it the 201 
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confidence that working hard and taking responsibility will be rewarded not punished” 202 
(Cameron, quoted in The Independent, 2011). 203 
To continue this point, negative connotations with planning as a statutory activity have been 204 
reinforced at every given opportunity.  Its tardiness has been heralded repeatedly and held 205 
up as the principal reason for the non-replacement of creaking infrastructure – despite the 206 
fact that approval times for major infrastructure projects are not at odds with any other 207 
period in modern history (Marshall, 2011).  By contrast, good planning has been repeatedly 208 
associated with the anti-statist narratives of localism and Big Society. 209 
This caricature of planning as somehow responsible for and simultaneously incapable of 210 
addressing many of the ills that confront British society represents a huge over-211 
simplification.  Problems of housing supply, outdated infrastructure and the cartoonish 212 
depiction of the allegedly sclerotic economics of provincial cities (Leunig et al., 2007) have 213 
been squarely laid at the door of planning.  In reality, the reasons for these circumstances 214 
are complex and historical. Indeed, many of these circumstances are actually the result of 215 
wilful political action, for example, the programme to hasten de-industrialisation in the 216 
1980s.   217 
Creating and reinforcing this impression of planning as responsible for many of the ills of our 218 
towns and cities is a political act of decontestation.  Imagining alternatives to a particular 219 
policy prescription, such as the fundamental dismantling of regulatory planning, are shut 220 
down as circumstances are manipulated to create one overwhelmingly negative impression: 221 
‘planning has created house price inflation’, ‘planning has prevented the development of 222 
high quality infrastructure such as they have in other countries’, ‘planning has placed a 223 
brake on economic growth’.  The specifics of the strategy and the language employed to 224 
effect this political strategy differ from moment to moment.  For example, in response to 225 
the question, what should replace regulatory planning nomenclature that existed during the 226 
New Labour years, ‘partnership’, ‘sustainable growth’ etc., understood as the discursive 227 
counterpart to the post-political, is now mirrored by a different set of linguistic preferences 228 
– ‘freedom’, ‘fairness’, ‘responsibility’ - in what Lakin (2013: 482) describes as a contingent 229 
outcome of Coalition politics: “Tory decontestations alloyed to liberal language”.  230 
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The point is that the terminology specific to a particular administration is of less relevance 231 
than the actions perpetrated in its name.  The Coalition’s repeated use of the word 232 
‘decentralisation’ is an excellent example as it is only one half of the story of what has 233 
actually been enacted.  In reality, a great many powers relating to planning (and other policy 234 
areas) have been fundamentally centralised under the auspices of decentralisation.  In the 235 
context of heresthetics, this is a classical tactic of decontestation: ‘double coding’, where 236 
one uses “words that say one thing, mean another and conceal a third” (Lakin, 2013: 481) to 237 
achieve a political end.    238 
To explore the degree to which these concepts of decontestation and heresthetics pertain 239 
to the processes of planning reform in England we can turn to the passage of the legislation 240 
that ultimately became the Localism Act 2011.  241 
Understanding the Act, understanding the action: the politics of legislative planning 242 
reform 243 
The Localism and Decentralisation Bill was introduced into Parliament on 13 December 244 
2010, heralding what the Secretary of State, Eric Pickles, promised to be a radical reform of 245 
the planning system.  If those words seem familiar, it is because previous ministerial 246 
incumbents have described other recent programmes of planning reform in much the same 247 
way (Stephen Byers in 2001 and Ruth Kelly in 2007).  The bill promised to abolish higher 248 
tiers of planning policy and control vested with Regional Assemblies and Regional 249 
Development Agencies and directly transfer some planning functions away from the 250 
representational democracy of English local government to autonomously assembled 251 
groups of citizens and/or businesses, thereby introducing for the first time ‘neighbourhood 252 
planning’.  On his appointment to the role, the Secretary of State for Communities and Local 253 
Government, articulated his opposition to strategic planning as a statutory activity – 254 
describing planning practice of the twentieth century as “the last bastion of Communism 255 
and sheer bloody-mindedness” (Pickles, quoted in Birmingham Evening Post, 2010) – and 256 
thus signaling radical overhaul of the system.   257 
The bill was not preceded by a White Paper as had been the case with previous examples of 258 
legislative reform to the planning system.  The purpose of a White Paper is to signal 259 
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overarching governmental intentions for reform in a particular policy area and to establish a 260 
broader national debate from which a subsequent bill might be fashioned.  A White Paper is 261 
intended partly to prevent delays to the legislative process on the grounds that debate and 262 
modification to proposals should occur before the formal process of seeking legislation.  263 
However, by not producing a preliminary White Paper, the Coalition government created 264 
the circumstances for the bill to undergo significant modification: in this case over 240 265 
amendments, more clauses than had been in the bill to start with.  The result was that the 266 
bill that entered the House of Commons bore only a passing resemblance to the Act that 267 
ultimately emerged in 2011. 268 
Prior to this legislative process the best indication interested parties had on the nature of 269 
any planning reform was provided by an open source Green Paper launched by the 270 
Conservatives whilst still in opposition just prior to the General Election (Conservative Party 271 
2010). The Green Paper reflected an ideological belief in localism as an extension of the 272 
Conservative’s localism agenda: 273 
we need a planning system that enables local people to shape their surroundings in a 274 
way that… is also sensitive to the history and character of a given location… Our 275 
conception of local planning is rooted in civic engagement and collaborative 276 
democracy as the means of reconciling economic development with quality of life... 277 
the planning system can play a major role in decentralising power and strengthening 278 
society (Conservative Party, 2010: 1). 279 
Within this agenda, localism was understood wholly as a political project to encourage 280 
‘double-devolution’ - a ‘return’ of decision making powers from the (local) state to 281 
individuals and communities - that had its roots in a the strain of classical conservative 282 
thinking associated particularly with Burke but also Hobbes and Disraeli.  In the case of 283 
urban and regional planning, this was construed as meaning greater use of local referenda, 284 
enhanced powers given to parish councils and new neighbourhood forums, the creation of 285 
local housing trusts, and, fundamentally, decision-making power devolved from local 286 
authorities to self-assembled groups of citizens.   287 
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For advocates the logic behind the initial statement in support of planning reform suggests 288 
measures to enhance place-based distinctiveness, a deeper understanding of planning 289 
issues by local people and an opening-up of policy and decision making to wider sections of 290 
society. However, this would require space to flourish.  Consequently, in parallel to the 291 
passage of the Localism and Decentralisation Bill, the government embarked on a tandem 292 
process, which did not require primary legislation, of dismantling higher tiers of strategic 293 
spatial policy.  In the English regions, this meant winding up Regional Assemblies (previously 294 
responsible for producing Regional Spatial Strategies) and Regional Development Agencies 295 
(the authors of Regional Economic Strategies): their removal deemed a necessary first step 296 
to clear the way for the devolution of policy and decision making to the lower spatial scales 297 
offered by the newly created landscape of localism and neighbourhood planning.  298 
Removing this regional layer of the New Labour state apparatus and replacing it with ‘the 299 
local’ of neighbourhood planning reveals a deep inconsistency in Conservative party politics.  300 
On one level, for the ‘Red Tories’ who wished to reawaken a Burkean strand in the party, 301 
replacing a regional state bureaucracy, by definition a decision making entity distant from 302 
the locations where the impacts of its actions were most keenly felt, with direct local action 303 
was a wholly positive step that would remove state interference from people’s lives 304 
allowing communities to devise their own, locally-attuned responses to issues such as 305 
housing supply.  However, in the affluent (and mostly Conservative voting) Home Counties 306 
around London where property developers were eager to bring forward proposals to meet 307 
latent demand for new housing, but where established communities were often hostile to 308 
any form of new development, the use to which communities may put their newly granted 309 
planning powers was likely to conflict directly with another strain of Conservative ideology: 310 
namely the ‘market first’ approach of Thatcherite Conservatism.  311 
In this way planning reform serves as an excellent example of the fundamental ideological 312 
tension at the core of Conservative party politics.  In practical terms, the result was another 313 
round of modification to the legislation as it passed through parliament in light of the 314 
Chancellor’s Budget statement of March 2011.  However, by this point Thatcherism had 315 
trumped Burke: the focus of the revisions was not born of a desire to further the devolution 316 
of planning powers to neighbourhoods but rather to prevent them using those powers to 317 
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inhibit economic growth. The Chancellor’s statement spoke much more clearly to the 318 
‘market obsessions’ of latter twentieth century Conservative ideology in that it was solely 319 
addressed to the issue of economic development - to the extent that it continued the 320 
Conservative caricature of land-use planning as a barrier to enterprise (cf. Heseltine quoted 321 
in Ward, 1994) and, unexpectedly, offered a new definition of sustainable development as 322 
‘job creation’.  Echoing calls from his colleague, the Secretary of State for Communities, for 323 
change in planning the Chancellor was just as forthright in his views: “We are going to tackle 324 
what every government has identified as a chronic obstacle to economic growth in Britain, 325 
and no government has done anything about: the planning system” (Osborne quoted in the 326 
New Statesman, 2011b).  Critically, the original focus, under which the legislation had 327 
entered the House of Commons, of providing communities with greater power to make 328 
their own planning policies had been replaced with what Inch (2014: 9) has referred to as 329 
the “hegemony of growth”. 330 
The striking feature of this management of the legislative passage of planning reform is that 331 
there exist two very different approaches within the same administration towards planning: 332 
first, a primarily rhetorical association between greater direct democracy and ‘localism’ for 333 
which the Conservatives can claim an ideological grounding in, principally, Burke; and, 334 
secondly, a much more hostile approach to planning as a regulatory activity which has its 335 
origins in Thatcherism.  The Green Paper that set out Conservative thinking on planning 336 
prior to the election as the senior partner in the Coalition Government came dressed in the 337 
clothes of local direct democracy, ‘Little Platoons’, Burke and ‘Red Toryism’.  However by 338 
the time a bill had been drafted and had had wholesale revisions made to it through the 339 
process of legislative passage, the costume change was striking.  Aspects of the language 340 
remained in place to appease those for whom neighbourhood planning would be the most 341 
tangible example of the Big Society in action (Blond, 2009), but these rhetorical devices had 342 
been fundamentally modified by the time the Act became law to ensure that devolution of 343 
planning powers would not be allowed to inhibit economic growth.  344 
By the spring of 2011 the legislation had been so heavily modified that it had become clear 345 
the image of planning reform masquerading as a movement towards direct local democracy 346 
had been transformed into a programme to fundamentally deregulate planning - 347 
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irrespective of whether it was regulation practiced by the professional planning of local 348 
government or citizen-centred planning of the neighbourhood forum.  The later stages of 349 
the parliamentary process saw government move to head off the potential for 350 
neighbourhood groups to use their newly established planning powers to reject new 351 
development and thereby hinder job-creation and growth.  The bill was amended once 352 
more to state that neighbourhood fora could not reject new development schemes, only 353 
approve them, or allow development on a larger scale than that approved by the local 354 
authority previously.  So much for introducing a new form of local planning “rooted in civic 355 
engagement and collaborative democracy as the means of reconciling economic 356 
development with quality of life” (Conservative Party, 2010: 1).  Moreover this imposition by 357 
the central state was, perversely, as much of a state-initiated top-down form of planning as 358 
the very system the reforms were designed to replace.  A final change to how the legislation 359 
was to be administered came with an announcement by the Communities Secretary that if 360 
local authorities or neighbourhoods sought to reject new development schemes, 361 
particularly for housing, against central government advice to approve them, some of the 362 
decentralised powers would be returned to central government, a process described by the 363 
minister as “muscular localism” (Pickles, quoted in The Spectator, 2012).  364 
Nevertheless, by the time the legislation came into effect in November 2011, the potential 365 
for battles raging on peri-urban land and protected green field sites in the Home Counties 366 
became a distinct possibility, and the subsequent years since the Localism Act became law 367 
in 2011 have been characterised by situations where neighbourhood planning fora have 368 
often inventively used their new powers defensively to prevent or radically diminish the 369 
scale of new development.  For the house building industry, used to dealing with the 370 
established, if bureaucratic, agencies that are local government planning departments, the 371 
new landscape of neighbourhood planning must be bewildering  and far less predictable 372 
than the ‘planning game’ that they have become accustomed to playing.  It is perhaps, 373 
therefore, predictable that there are some reports of developers seeking to interfere with 374 
the processes through which neighbourhood planning powers are exercised (The Times, 375 
2014b).  Perhaps the most likely winner from this new system will be the legal profession as 376 
disputes between neighbourhood planning fora, strongly in favour of preserving the status 377 
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quo, and developers, keen to fulfil the Treasury’s urgent call to get the economy moving, are 378 
likely to become more intense and will probably only be resolved through the courts and 379 
case law.   380 
The ideology of attack politics 381 
None of the foregoing discussion of post-2010 planning reforms can be fully understood 382 
without reference to political ideologies. When looking at the post-2010 planning reforms 383 
instigated by the UK’s coalition government, the word that seems to resonate most with 384 
many commentators is “localism”.  Perhaps it is the territorial implications of the word that 385 
make it so attention grabbing for those with a background in planning/geography.  386 
However, it is important to note that this ephemeral scale - ‘the local’ - that has aroused so 387 
much interest is the government’s preferred locus of power only after that power has been 388 
removed from much more clearly identifiable, formal scales of government.  Indeed, it is 389 
important to note that the Bill that formed the basis for the 2011 Localism Act was known 390 
by its full name as the Localism and Decentralisation Bill.  The significance of this is that 391 
whilst we may easily become embroiled in spatial discussion over the many alternatives for 392 
what it might mean to be ‘local’, the primary objective of first decentralising power is much 393 
clearer.  This antipathy to the central state and the quest to diminish it, in all senses of that 394 
word, places the Conservative-led coalition government firmly as the ideological descendant 395 
of Thatcherism, particularly the objective of ‘rolling back the frontiers of the state’.  Indeed, 396 
the most recent Conservative case for the replacement of aspects of public life that have 397 
historically been the responsibility of the state with voluntary action was informed by a 398 
paper, Direct Democracy, authored by Douglas Carswell (2002) who would go on to be 399 
elected Conservative MP for Clacton in 2005 before defecting to the anti-EU party, UKIP, in 400 
2014.  Successive iterations along similar lines (Carswell, 2005: Carswell and Hannan, 2008) 401 
and a parallel campaign launched in the Daily Telegraph (2010), established a direct line of 402 
continuity between the ‘command economy’ which had been confronted and dismantled by 403 
Thatcher in the 1980s and the ‘command state’ that would be the priority for similar 404 
treatment under any future Conservative-led government.   405 
In the same way that we have been preoccupied with the new territorial scale to emerge 406 
from the Coalition reforms, the local, so too academic interest has been greatly invigorated 407 
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by the emerging agencies that have begun to populate these spaces.  For example there are 408 
now studies of the institutional apparatus that has sprung up in response to the call of 409 
localism: the nascent neighbourhood planning fora (Holman and Rydin, 2013), Local 410 
Economic Partnerships (Pugalis, 2011), Enterprise Zones, and City Deals (Marlow, 2013).  411 
However it is again important to note that these agencies and organisations derive their 412 
power in direct proportion to those formal state actors that have simultaneously lost it, 413 
particularly local authorities where budgets have been cut severely.  The extent of this 414 
purge of local government, the seat of formal urban planning, can barely be exaggerated: by 415 
2015 the UK government is forecast to have a proportionate public sector spend below that 416 
of the USA for the first time in its history (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2010). As Lakin (2013: 417 
488) has remarked, “by 2015 the Coalition Government will have created a Britain that looks 418 
more like the United States”. 419 
What all this reveals is that this act of depriving formal state actors of political power is itself 420 
a political mission that closely mirrors Thatcherite ideology - a connection that is well made 421 
in the political science literature both in relation to the leadership style of David Cameron 422 
(Evans, 2010; Garnett, 2013) and the fundamental policy objectives of the Coalition 423 
programme (Bale, 2010; Buckler and Dolowitz, 2010; Lakin, 2013; Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 424 
2011).  The parallels between 1980s Thatcherite ideology and the political actions of the 425 
Coalition government are perhaps even greater. The drive to create a small but powerful 426 
central state in some areas (law and order, defence) whilst reducing and eliminating other 427 
aspects of state activity (most obviously local government) has famously been analysed as 428 
the fundamental hallmark of Thatcherism.  For the Conservative-led coalition government 429 
and its Conservative successors under Cameron and May similar ideological objectives can 430 
be identified that are particularly well exemplified through planning reform.  Together with 431 
the drive to decentralise planning control to the ‘local’ and “dismantle” (Whelan, 2012: 1) 432 
English local government within which it sits, many of the most important aspects of 433 
planning have been radically centralised.  In this respect, infrastructure priorities are 434 
determined through the National Infrastructure Plan, produced not by the planning 435 
ministry, the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), but by the 436 
Treasury (HM Treasury, 2011).  Authority over infrastructure decisions is vested with the 437 
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Secretary of State at DCLG and there is an emerging precedent for significant new 438 
infrastructure to be overseen by the central state: for example Crossrail, the new 439 
underground rail link between east and west London, upon its inception Europe’s largest 440 
construction project, was planned and initiated by Crossrail Ltd., a bespoke company set up 441 
by the Department for Transport and Transport for London. 442 
The lasting impression is one of ideological continuity.  The profound changes that have 443 
occurred over the five year period 2010-2015 are consonant with the programme of reform 444 
begun by Thatcher.  Planning is now not one activity but two.  First, in the lower reaches of 445 
social space it is virtually a free-for-all where a myriad of agencies - Neighbourhood Planning 446 
fora, developers, Local Economic Partnerships, Enterprise Zones, City Deals and what is left 447 
of local authorities - jostle for room to achieve their, sometimes contrasting, objectives.  As 448 
noted above, such is the diffuse nature of political power at these various understandings of 449 
what a ‘local’ scale might be that there is evidence of neighbourhood planning fora 450 
successfully attempting to frustrate large scale housing developments through the powers 451 
devolved to them under the 2011 Localism Act (The Times, 2014a).  For proponents what is 452 
said to have materialised is a return of political power to communities (Blond, 2009).  But a 453 
‘return’ of power demands a diminution of some other agency’s capacity to act.   The 454 
contention of this paper is that the agency that has lost out most in this bargain and that has 455 
seen power displaced downwards to autonomously organised groups of citizens is local 456 
authority planning.  Moreover, far from having its origins in Burke, we could point to the 457 
amendments and modifications made to the Localism Act that suggest a more complex 458 
marriage of Conservative ideologies with a far more prominent concern for the market.   459 
The second form planning now takes is one where the serious business of the nation’s 460 
physical development is centralised.  Airports, power stations, high speed rail and any other 461 
conception of significant infrastructure is covered by the National Infrastructure Plan (HM 462 
Treasury, 2011); the identification of a development by government as a “nationally 463 
significant infrastructure project” allows the process to circumvent local planning.  If we 464 
look for the origins of this approach we can find it in calls for a similar centralisation of 465 
planning powers by the Confederation of British Industry in 1986 (CBI, 1986), expressed 466 
sporadically again over the following thirty years (CBI, 1992, 2000, 2005).  Again, the story is 467 
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not one of contrast but rather great continuity with the 1980s Conservative critique of 468 
planning.  Indeed, it could be argued that the governments in which the Conservatives have 469 
played a role since 2010 have been far more successful than Thatcher ever was in 470 
fundamentally altering planning practice.  471 
Conclusions 472 
Since 2010 planning in Britain has been remade. The scale of reform instigated by, first the 473 
Coalition government and subsequently the Conservative administrations elected in 2015 474 
and 2017, is profound with many planning powers centralised either at Westminster or to 475 
the increasingly separate devolved administrations in the Celtic nations.  The result of this is 476 
that all the headline-grabbing planning decisions relating to major infrastructure are now 477 
within the political aegis of the relevant central state ministry.  For everything else a residual 478 
regulatory planning framework exists within local authorities but in radically diminished 479 
form.  Instead, this middle ground of political power that has existed at various times with 480 
formal organs of the state covering clearly delineated territories - local authorities, regional 481 
development agencies - has been excavated.  The contrast is stark: a movement of political 482 
power upwards to the centre where control is rigid, and a simultaneous dispersal of power 483 
downwards to whomsoever is sufficiently cognisant that this has happened to seize it.    484 
This is largely not the result of happenstance or technocratic experimentation.  It is a 485 
political project to continue a programme of reform begun in the 1980s, continued at a 486 
slower pace in the 1990s and 2000s and now, under a very effective heresthetic political 487 
leadership, one that is ripe for completion.  From this perspective, what is left of planning is 488 
best understood as the remnants of a professional activity that has been caught between 489 
the twin impulses of roll-back and roll-out neoliberalism, that has seen many of its core 490 
functions either vested in a small but intensely powerful central state or residualised within 491 
local authorities, to be gradually overtaken and replaced by the ‘jungle laws’ (Peck, 2002) 492 
under which élites thrive.     493 
The implications of this fundamental change in what we mean when we discuss planning are 494 
far reaching.  The concept of planning as an activity that could serve the public interest 495 
becomes redundant: public interest is superseded by ‘national significance’ understood as 496 
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applying solely to infrastructure or else diminished to local priorities embedded in a 497 
neighbourhood plan for a handful of streets.  Everything in between, both in the scalar and 498 
moral sense, is part of a vocabulary and politics that has been removed from the debate 499 
through a process of political decontestation.  The idea that planning should have social 500 
objectives or that it could play a progressive role in addressing issues such as housing 501 
shortages, health inequalities and adaptation to climate change through strategic-scale 502 
planning seems increasingly non-viable: not because it genuinely is non-viable but rather 503 
because planning has been skilfully displaced onto the ‘wrong’ side of a political argument.  504 
All of this speaks directly to the idea of the post-political in which the parameters of what it 505 
makes sense to discuss are limited and prescribed.  Accepting this, it is our contention that 506 
creating this limited and prescribed debate has been an ideologically motivated political act. 507 
Much of the research on what our future cities will become focuses on issues that would 508 
once have been squarely in the remit of strategic planning.  Issues such as urban agriculture, 509 
local energy generation and the range of data and technology-inspired themes that are 510 
collapsed under the heading ‘smart cities’ are areas that have an important history within 511 
planning both as an intellectual and professional activity.  The fact that governments such as 512 
that of the UK increasingly see little or no role for professional planning in these debates is 513 
indicative of the extent to which planning is being, or has been, overtaken and replaced by 514 
others: engineers, economists and environmental scientists being three significant groups.  515 
It was this marginalisation of planning that so exercised Peter Hall in what was to be his final 516 
article before his death (Hall, 2014).   517 
However, resituating planning from the margins to a position closer to the centre of political 518 
decision making may not be a forlorn hope.  The renewal of the political Left in England 519 
since the election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader the Labour Party in 2015 has heralded a 520 
renewed enthusiasm for state-led responses to a range of issues – some of which, such as 521 
housing unaffordability, speak directly to planning.    Moreover, this disruption to the post 522 
political order has called into question the accepted norms of what is politically possible 523 
that just a few years previously had seemed so fixed.  Future years will show whether we 524 
are embarking on a new political moment for planning.  525 
 526 
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